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Since the late <eighties, Philip Fisher has emerged as a 
distinctively American kuiturkritik. Indeed. he has been claiming of 
late that it is the radical task of the United States to forge ever new 
modes of representation, be it culturally or socially, commercially or 
technological1y. Nowhere. according to Fisher in Still the New World 
(1999), is the 'one pennanent revolution, that of competltIve 
technological capitalism' better demonstrated than in the poetry. 
painting, and novels of radical modernity that is America. At the same 
time, Fisher is mindful of the way in which our cultural institutions, 
particularly museums, remove art works from their original contexts 
not only from their place amongst objects with which they were 
initially grouped, but also from the multitude of attitudes and activities 
by means of which they were regarded. Instead. so Fisher contends in 
Making and Effacing Art (1991), past works are fundamentaUy re-
assembled in order to locate them stylistically. if not temporally, with 
other works. By so doing. museums nowadays can be construed as the 
specific destination of contemporary and future artworks; a destination 
with which modern painting - notably that of Jasper Johns and Frank 
Stella ~ has engaged in a teasing dialogue. 
However, the temptation to plot Fisher's revival of interest in the 
notion of the wondrous against this larger background of concerns 
shall be resisted in this critical review. Instead, let us depict 
something of the terrain of Wonder, the Rainbow, and the A esthetics 
of Pure Experiences. Carefully focusing our attention upon the 
'fragile' notion of making sense or becoming intelligible. as distinct 
from the nature of knowing or certainty itself. intimates that the work 
under review is. in its author's terms, an 'antiphilosophical project' 
(pp. 8, 9). Perhaps it is rhetorically 'antiphilosophical' in so far as 
Fisher preys upon traditional appeals to the sublime in aesthetic 
enquiry and, more poil1tedly, deletes Kant entirely from discussion. 
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Nonetheless. Fisher appears to begin conventionally enough when 
he seizes upon Socrates' assertion in the Theaetetus (155dl-5) that the 
feeling of wonder is the only point at which philosophy properly 
begins. But how are we to understand the concept of wonder? Is it 
applicable to states of astonishment or amazement. admiration or awe, 
fascination or sorcery. stupor or stupefaction, and so forth? Is our 
experience of it to be described as absorbed or enthralled, bewildered or 
flabbergasted t dumfounded or dazzled, startled or surprised, and so on? 
Shoutd we construe 'wonder' adjectivally or nominally so to speak -
as 'How wondrous!' or as 'What a wonder!' respectively? Or, would it 
be better countenanced as a verb - 'to wonder why' (or, presumably, 
'whether ... which ... when ... how ... what ... a1' and so on)? 
Fisher detl~ts such questions by briefly glossing some of these 
possibilities with the observation that the English expression 'to 
wonder if preserves both the exclamatory and the interrogative uses of 
the term (p. 11). 
Experience of wonderment. we are urged, deserves as much 
attention as is traditionally given to experience of sublimity. It, too, 
functions as a test-case not only of the powerful role of the rare or the 
uncommon within aesthetic experience, but also of what might be 
called 'intellectual seeing'. the intersection of sensation and thought. 
For Fisher, however. the sublime seems to function as an 
'aestheticization of fear' which, 'with its epistemological companion. 
fixed attention or obsession', reached its historical peak in the 
'fatigued' art of the ·old world' of Europe (pp. 2, 38-39, 5). By 
contrast, he contends, the wondrous functions as an 'aestheticization of 
delight' which dramatically emerged with the 'ever new continents of 
technique and materials' deployed by architecture and painting 
'especially ... since 1873. the founding moment of Impressionism' 
(pp. 2, 6, 3). Fisher cont ~nds that, ever since the advent of a Louis 
Sullivan and a Claude Monet. the wondrous effect of ·our first 
experiences of never before used materials is denied to writing' (p. 6). a 
point that begins~ as we shall discover, a curious sub-theme of 
Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Pure Experiences. 
Yet, in seemingJy disparate scientific, mathematical, and artistic 
cases of wonder lies the persistent characteristic of 'a slow unfolding of 
attention and questioning [which] takes place in the presence of the 
work' or phenomenon (pp. 6·7); a characteristic whose 'essence'. in 
other words, ·is the play of the mind over the details of the object 
itself' (p. 39). Contrary to those upholding the 'romantic' conception 
that explanation abolishes wonderment, Fisher constantly maintains 
that there is a 'poetics of thought' which preserves wonder when 
explanation [s found In succeSSIve geometric or visual 
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conceptualisations of a conundrum. For that reason, continues Fisher, 
'memory and narrative are antagonistic to an aesthetics of wonder' (p. 
6). Nor should wondennent be identified with the conception of 
estrangement, a conception along with that of sublimity that Fisher 
ties to the dominant, but misguided 'romantic' idiom of so much of 
European artistic practice. 
Having thus mapped the conceptual territory of the wondrous, 
Fisher then pursues the history of that wonder of nature, the rainbow, 
largely in the work of Descartes; that wonder of mathematics1 the 
doubled square, in Plato's Meno; and. finally, wondennent in the 
presence of· two large, abstract artworks by Edwin Parker 'Cy' 
Twombly. Before sketching some salient points arising from his 
discussion of Twombly, it is worth noting a number of assumptions 
underlying Fisher's extensive account of the rainbow, 'a central 
instance of the aesthetics of wonder' (p. 33), predominantly drawn 
from that furnished by Carl Boyer in The Rainbow (1987). First of all, 
to enter a state of wonderment. its object must be sudden and 
unexpected; its occurrence only emerges with 'the moment of first 
seeing' ~ and its experience derives from 'the visual presence of the 
whole state or object' (p. 21). To that extent, anything which unfolds 
in timet which is sequentially or narratively conveyed, is, on Fisher's 
account, precluded from being an object of wonder. Secondly, the 
experience of wonder involves 'subjectivity in a unique way' (p. 36). 
Indeed, the very appearance of a rainbow is only possible because of 
the angle between rays of light, water droplets, and the observer to the 
pornt that. were there no human observers, there would be no 
rainbows. To recognise the convergence of angles and points of view 
involved in diagrammatic forms of its visual representation is 
dependent upon our imaginative capacity to 'step out of ourselves and 
picture ourselves having an experience' (p. 123). Thirdly, to account 
for the psychology of wonder and its interaction with thought or 
cognition, we ought to adhere to Descartes' later conception of 
psychology in Les Passions de I 'arne (1649). 
Readers may recall how wonder (l 'admiration) is declared by 
Descartes to be 'the first of all the passions' (part 2. art. 53). Being 'a 
sudden surprise of the sour causes wonder 'to consider with attention 
the objects which seem to it rare and extraordinary' (part 2, art. 70). It 
is the ~uhar function of wonder to intensify our other primitive 
passions or the subspecies of them since, without such an interaction 1 
wonder alone 'prevents OUf perceiving more of the object than the first 
face which is presentecf and thereby precludes us from 'acquiring a 
more particular knowledge of it' (part 2, art. 73). Wonder, in this 
Cartesian scheme. 'causes us to learn and retain in our memory things 
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of which we were fonnerly ignorant' (part 2, art. 74). Conversely 
expressed, without wonder we would be condemned to ignorance, 
though. with an excess of wonder, we might equally ani 
indiscriminately condemn ourselves to its diminution or simply fail to 
acquire further knowledge of the object that once arrested us (part 2, 
art. 78). Like Descartes, Fisher aligns this 'first of all passions' with 
sensation and imagination. that is, with the perceptual faculties of the 
mind that arise in response to the external world; unlike Descartes, 
however, Fisher is not pre-occupied with the interplay and control of 
wonder and the other passions. with the moral role the passions play. 
Whereas wonder without 'excess' does not have 'good or evil as its 
object'. the end served by the passions as a whole 'consist~ alone in 
their fortifying and perpetuating in the soul thoughts which it is good 
it should preserve' (part 2, art. 73, 7 L & 74). Perhaps it is for this 
kind of reason that Fisher concentrates upon the pleasurable effects of 
wonder at the expense of its terrifying ones. 
After attempting to dissuade us of the efficacy of memory and 
recognition in encounters with new works of art\ Fisher's concluding, 
seventh chapter centres upon how they involve ~the process of 
intelligibility, the path from wonder, surprise, a feeling of newness 
and attention-seizing freshness to curiosity, prolonged attention. 
satisfaction' (p. 149), the very process said to be evident in encounters 
with the geometric resolution of the rainbow and the doubling of the 
square. Two large canvases by Cy Twombly, Untitled (1970) and II 
Parnasso (1964). act as Fisher's test-cases of 'radically new works ... 
with which we are unfamiliar, which we cannot place in genres or 
patterns of knowledge' (p. 140). Again, as in the mutatis mutandis 
case of the rainbow and of the doubled square. Fisher portrays in 
mesmerising detail a first encounter at the New York Museum of 
Modem Art (unnamed) with the massive 1970 canvas - 405 x 640.3 
em of house paint and crayon - as follows: 
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To look at the work we have to think out the collision of two 
recognitions: what a painting is and what writing on a blackboard 
with chalk is. By opening gaps or unexpected features within these 
two recognitions the work directs us, after our initial surprise and 
wonder, to a controlled set of questions and details. We begin ... from 
a classic state of wonder. We have never seen anything like this 
before. Its scale. simplicity, and loveliness. the elegance of the 
looping lines, its colorless beauty, strike us all at once. Its every 
detail is present for our first glance when we come across the work for 
the first time in a museum. Twombly's painting solicits a very precise 
and ordered attention, now to this, now to thal, and it gives us a very 
clear path to intelligibility .... An inference pattern is set off 
Reviews 
between the pair of recognitions, along with their details, that opens 
up the path to intelJigibjJity (pp. 151-152). 
For all its absorbing detail, his eloquent account from his ~horizon 
as a teacher' (p. 157) of the artistically 'innocent' or dlXontextuaJised 
individual making sense of Twombly seems to work at cross-purposes 
with some of the contentions of his previous chapters. The initial 
tension arises with the acknowledgement that contemporary art, 
instead of renouncing the act of recognition, has redrrected it away 
. from tradition, the slock of art and genres of art that make up our past, 
and toward the immediate surrounding culture itself, which can, in the 
work of art, be alluded to, mentioned, mocked, celebrated, or even 
transfigured. These varieties of reference and recognition lead back to 
the familiar, but we find them now directed toward some shared 
memory from our everyday experience, not our knowledge of the 
history of art Instead of a conversation with the tradition, we find a 
kind of mtertextuality with everyday life (pp. 149-150). 
Indee(t Fisher confesses that he reje{;ted deaJing with the work in the 
context of 'American art in the generation after Jackson Pollock' (p. 
157). Two overt reasons are given. Firstly, Fisher wants to emphasize 
'the primary and very democratic recognition on which this work is 
founded', namely, 'each person's memory of how a blackboard works 
in a schoolroom' (p. 157). Secondly, he believes that Twombly's 
painting 'does not depend on our creating a ... type of history into 
which it neatly fits: use of line after Pollock' (p. 157). 
Curiously, Fisher does not take any other kinds of context or 
response into account. Anecdotally, this reviewer's young daughter 
began to laugh on first sighting Twombly, convinced that it was 
drawn by an elephant. His wife immediately wondered, if it were not 
untitled or if it contained names, numbers or even fragmented 
utterances in the manner of other works by Twombly, whether we 
would change the way we look at and think of it or whether it would 
ever figure in the Museum in the first piace. To the reviewer, though 
struck by the gigantic scale, two contexts were immediately 
foregrounded: that of other paintings and drawings by Twombly 
himself and those by his contemporaries and colleagues, Jasper Johns 
and Robert Rauschenberg. Indeed, for many readers of this journal let 
alone Fisher's book. encounters with Twombly may well be initially 
shaped by having seen photographic reproductions of works. Or again, 
some viewers may approach Twombly for the first time after having 
read the seminal essays, 'Non multa sed multum' and 'Sagesse re 
!' Art', published in 1979 by his most illustrious supporter, Roland 
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Barthes, but ignored here by Fisher. In sum. Fisher comes rather close 
to a purity of context and response that brute and institutional facts 
would seem to deny. 
At the same time, much energy is devoted to re-assigning 
recognition and recollection, noting Its apparent non-a vailabiJity when 
first facing new or alien artistic practices for which 'we have no 
anecdote, no allegory, no clue to social purpose, subject, or proper 
aesthetic comportment' (p. (42). Fisher. whilst articulating what it is 
like to immerse oneself in the diversity of detail in Twombly's II 
Parnasso (J 964), asks, "Does every act of seetningly naive description 
.smuggle recognitions back in without admitting it?' (p. 168). His 
affinnative answer, however~ is directed at opposing the rigidities of 
historically ~ psychologically, or even theologically weighted 
responses to artworks 'in which any set of traces or marks can be 
allegorized into our favorite narrative of the moment' (p. 169). In its 
place, we need 'more varied currents of implication' than the analogical 
or the allegorical tend to provide since what the path towards 'partial' 
inteHigibihty gives us is "more like a feeling, after a period of time, of 
what we call knowing our way around the work. as we know our way 
around a city' (pp. 169, 175). It is for this reason that FisJ"ler rejects 
any attempt at directly correlating Twombly with Parnassus (15 I 0), 
one of Raphael's four wall frescoes in the Stanza della Segnatura of the 
Vatican. It is not as if one were a 'coded translation' of the other 
because, Fisher believes, treating the Raphael as a 'source' ends in 
'distracting explanation' (pp. 176 & 178). Rather, Fisher finds the 
two, for all their independence of materials and techniques, probing 
much the same theme, namely. 'the technical, phy.sical mystery of his 
own art. painting. by means of a tribute to the rival art of poetry with 
its great masters Homer, Sappho. and Dante' (p. 178). 
Why, to return to the theme of the contrast between the verbal and 
the visual arts, should Fisher take such pains with the matter of 
memory? From the onset, he argues that ;memory and narrative are 
antagonistic to an aesthetics of wonder' (p. 6). In terms of his 
Cartesian aesthetic. Fisher distinguishes memory and its attendant 
expectations from wonder in terms of the former being subject to the 
will and the latter being dependent upon 'the complete absence of 
expectation' (p. 2 L). Furthermore, memory is intrinsic to the 'arts of 
time--narrat'on. dance, and music', none of which are 'present as a 
whole in an instant of time' I so that wonder is at best "replaced ... by 
mere surprise, as in a twist of plot' and, at worst, 'ruled out' (p. 21). 
To those who would accuse Fisher of ignoring the narrative dimenSion 
of the visuaJ arts~ his concession is to claim that 'control over it has 
passed from the artist to the viewer' (p. 23). To those who would 
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accuse Fisher of ignoring the non-narrative verbal arts as found in the 
lyric genre, his counterclaim is to point at the 'syntactic and 
grammatical expectations' basic to lyric and narrative alike (p. 22), 
Cast in slightly different terms, Fisher regards the visual as having 
a 'paratactic structure' - a listing of elements Cand ... and ... and . 
. . '.) - whereas the verbal is possessed of a "hypotactic structure': a 
logical or causal connection amongst elements ('if ... then . . .', 
'because. , .• , 'unless. , ,', and so forth) which he identifies with 
narrative if not memory (p, 98), Only when writing approximates the 
visual in the form of an algebraic equation, a diagram, or a list of 
notes does it ltransfer the successive into the simultaneous' and do we 
• 
'push ourselves toward a more and more simultaneous presence of 
what had to be in the memory a successive series of facts' (pp. 131-
132). Whilst memory, rooted in time, only allows two elements to be 
'directly adjacent to each other', the visual enables a multiplicity of 
elements to bear this relationship (p. 132). The consequences of such 
an argument verge upon the bizarre, For example. how are we to 
construe Cy Twombly's Discourses on Commodus (1963)? In so far as 
this abstract work comprises nine large canvas panels - 204 x 134 
cm each - which cannot be viewed simultaneously. are we to treat it 
narratively or sequentially and thus never wondrously? Conversely, 
how are we to construe Twombly's drawing, Orpheus (1975), with its 
four pencilled lines scrawled across the bottom: 
Be ever dead in Eurydice, mount more singingly 
Mount more praising1y back into the pure relation 
fire, among the warning, he in the realm of [decline?], 
be a ringtng glass thal shivers even as it rings? 
Can we only experience wonder with the non-verbal portion of the 
drawing, and only a modicum of mere surprise with the verbal? For 
those of us with more literary inclinations, the writings of a William 
Blake in Songs 0/ Experience (1794) or a Guil1aume Apollinaire in 
Calligrammes (1918) would raise much the same puzzlement. Nor can 
we so uncriticaHy presume, as does Fisher. that reading is purely 
reducible to the sequential, let alone organised paratactical1y. Whether 
taken from the individual perspective of reader-response developed by a 
Wolfgang lser in. say. The Implied Reader (1974) or from the 
communal perspective of contrastive rhetoric developed by a Robert 
Kaplan in, say. The Anatomy of Rhetoric (1972), the dynamics of 
reading literal and non~literal texts has been long underst<XXl to be as 
finely nuanced as Fisher suggests is the case with coming to know our 
way around a painting. 
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In so far as Fisher can be said to have resurrected a Cartesian 
aesthetic by which to capture the experience of natural and human 
artefacts and their transformation into objects of intelligibility, 
Wonder, fhe Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Pure Experiences 
constitutes a significant contribution to aesthetic enquiry. Yet nagging 
doubts remain over and above those already outlined. Perhaps they can 
be summarised in terms of the lack of engagement with aesthetic 
debate. To characterise wonderment as the gradual 'unfolding of 
attention and questioning' in the presence of an object, as 'the play of 
the mind over the details of the object itself' (pp. 6. 39), fails to 
differentiate it from Kant's conception of the beautiful. Indeed, Fisher's 
encounter with the paintings of Twombly comprjsing the last sixth of 
his book could arguably be interpreted as a practical exposition of the 
very tradition he scorns. So the suspicion remains: is this encounter 
not one which ultimately rehearses the fourfold characterisation of the 
aesthetic experience of beauty with which Kant concludes the first part 
of his Kritik der UrteilskraJt (1793)? 
R. A. GOODRICH 
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